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Abstract
We analyse the well-known TORQ dataset of trades on the NYSE over a 3-month period,
breaking down transactions depending on whether the active or passive side was institu-
tional or private. This allows us to compare the returns on the di¤erent trade categories.
We nd that, however we analyse the results, institutions are best informed, and earn
highest returns when trading with individuals as counterparty. We also conrm the con-
clusions found elsewhere in the literature that informed traders often place limit orders,
especially towards the end of the day (as predicted on the basis of laboratory experiments
in Bloomeld, OHara, and Saar (2005)). Finally, we nd that trading between institutions
accounts for the bulk of trading volume, but carries little information and seems to be largely
liquidity-driven.
JEL Classication: G14, G12
Keywords: liquidity trade, informed trades
1 Introduction
A large literature has appeared in recent years dealing with questions relating to the way
information is disseminated in modern stock markets, which is hardly surprising given that
the issues are of obvious importance for traders, investors and regulators. Are institutions
informed or at least better informed than individuals? Do informed traders place limit
orders? Is there more information in early morning trades? Are spreads larger for informed
trades? The microstructure literature has addressed questions like these empirically, some-
times theoretically, and in one important recent case, experimentally, yet they remain far
from being resolved.
A possible starting point would be the question of how to distinguish informed from
uninformed traders. A number of di¤erent approaches have been taken here. On the one
hand, the question can be sidestepped by simply identifying institutions as informed traders
and taking individuals as uninformed, an assumption which has been challenged on empiri-
cal grounds by Lee, Lin and Liu (1999). Alternatively, it has been traditionally argued that
to be informed is to be active (e.g. Glosten (1994)). On this view, the relevant distinc-
tion involves no more than separating market orders from limit orders, an assertion which
has been questioned on both theoretical and empirical grounds (Kaniel and Liu (2006),
Bloomeld, OHara, and Saar (2005)). A more indirect, less arbitrary approach starts from
a theoretical model and tries to estimate the probability that any given transaction is
information-based or purely noise trade, using as an indicator a measure of order imbal-
ance (e.g. Easley, Hvidkjaer and OHara (2002), Easley et al (2002)).
In an inuential recent paper, Bloomeld, OHara, and Saar (2005)addressed these ques-
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tions in an experimental setting, nding that informed traders do not, as previously assumed,
always take liquidity o¤ the market. Instead, they start the day by using their informational
advantage to pick o¤ mispriced limit orders while they are available, thereby driving the
market towards the true price and progressively eroding the value of their information. To-
wards the end of the day, they switch increasingly to limit orders, presumably because the
value of their information has diminished to the point where it is outweighed by the prospect
of avoiding the bid-ask spread.
However, the acid test of informativeness is whether it makes money in actual market
conditions. In other words, if informed traders are those who rationally make the best
possible use of available information, then by denition they must on average make excess
returns in dealing with the uninformed. It follows that, wherever the data makes it possible
to track subsequent returns, we can measure information directly and, moreover, use the
results as a check on the accuracy of other, more indirect measures, like the probability of
information-based trade (henceforth: PIN) mentioned earlier, and of the other assumptions
made in the literature.1
In this paper, we get to the heart of the matter by examining the well-known TORQ
dataset in detail. Specically, we take the approach of Anand, Chakravarty and Martell (2005)
a stage further. Whereas they analyse the data by whether trades are initiated by institu-
tions or individuals, we do the same on the active and passive sides. In other words, we
break down the set of all transactions into subsets, depending on whether the traders are
institutional or individual2, whether they are active or passive, and whether they are buys
1 Our use of returns is closely related to Hasbroucks (1991a, 1991b) measure of trade informativeness by
price impact via a vector autoregressive model of trades and mid-quote returns.
2 Strictly, as a result of the clustering of deals, it is impossible completely to unscramble institutional
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or sells. Thus, we have eight classes: institution-initiated buys from (sales to) passive in-
dividuals , denoted B(i-u) and S(i-u) respectively, institution-initiated buys from (sales to)
passive institutions, B(i-i) and S(i-i), and similarly, individual-initiated buys from (sales to)
passive individuals, B(u-u) and S(u-u), and individual-initiated buys from (sales to) passive
institutions, B(u-i) and S(u-i). The motivation for following this route is that, if informed
traders sometimes choose to place limit orders, as suggested by Kaniel and Liu (2006) in the
context of a model of optimal trade strategy and by Bloomeld, OHara, and Saar (2005) in
an experimental setting, looking only at the active side of trades may be seriously misleading.
Examining returns (as well as other market variables such as volume and spread) disag-
gregated in this way, we are able to answer a number of the questions in the literature. First,
we show that institutions are indeed better informed than individuals, an advantage they are
able to exploit to earn higher returns, through actively initiating trades (Chakravarty (2001),
Wong and Girardin (2007)). Second, we are able to track the changing situation over the
six and a half hours in the trading day, to show that the informativeness of trade drops
steadily over the day and, moreover, that informed traders tend to submit limit buy or-
ders towards the end of the days trading, both of which results conrm the ndings of
Bloomeld, OHara, and Saar (2005)in their experiment-based research. We are also able
to show that the bulk of trading throughout the day is between institutions. As such, it
carries little information and seems to be largely motivated by liquidity considerations. This
conclusion may provide some justication for the insistence by Duarte and Young (2007)
and individual deals. We initially apply the 50% rule here: if more than half of the active side of a trade is
institutional, we classify it accordingly. Later, we examine the robustness of our results to changes in this
criterion.
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on decomposing PIN into its liquidity and information components. It may also be seen
as supporting the association of high trade volume with di¤erences in the way information
is interpreted, which (Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Bamber, Barron and Stober (1999))
o¤er as an explanation of the fact that high levels of activity often result in only small
movement in prices.3
We start with a brief discussion of our dataset. We then go on to examine the evidence
from the disaggregation of trades on whether or not institutions appear to be informed
traders able to earn excess returns. The evidence from gross returns data for periods that
are sometimes overlapping turns out to be largely conrmed by formal regressions. We go
on in the succeeding section to consider the pattern of trading over the day, before nishing
with a few concluding comments.
2 The TORQ Dataset
The TORQ database of transactions, quotes, orders and audit trail data for the 3 months
November 1990 to January 1991 has been widely used in the published literature and is
well-known enough not to need detailed description.4 In this paper, only 8 rms with
fewer than 100 lines of quotes and with spreads larger than 50% are excluded from the
study, so that our ndings are free from the e¤ects of outliers. We thus have 136 NYSE
stocks as our sample. The descriptive statistics given in Table 1 show the sample size
broken down by transaction type. Out of a total dataset comprising nearly half a million
buy and sell trades, institutions were the active side (i.e placed market orders) in about
3 See also the market-sidedness interpretation in Sarkar and Schwartz (2007).
4 See Hasbrouck (1992) for more details.
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two out of every three cases which could be classied. In volume terms, the institutional
predominance is even more marked, as their trades are on average over three times as great
as those of individuals.5 We are concerned here with measuring the information in share
dealing, as indicated by the post-trade return, dened as the log di¤erence in the mid-quote
price in the hour following a transaction. Average and median returns were signicantly6
positive for buy trades, but negative on average (median zero) for sells. The net e¤ect was
positive, since the market rose somewhat over this three-month period. In addition to the
(best) bid-ask spreads , the Table also gives two indicators related to market depth. The
sum of the number of shares on o¤er at the lowest selling price and the number being bid
for at the highest buying price represents a measure of liquidity. The di¤erence between
the two could be regarded as a reection of information asymmetry (e.g. Ranaldo (2004),
Harris and Panchapagesan (2005)), a proposition which is consistent with the sign pattern:
a positive (negative) bid minus ask depth implies that investors are impatient to buy (sell),
which in turn forecasts an upward (downward) movement in price.
3 Are institutions informed?
The top section of Table 2 contains an analysis of the dataset by type of transaction. In the
top half, we give the results for buy trades where both sides were individuals (u-u), where the
active side was an institution while the passive was a private individual (i-u), the opposite
5 Interestingly, for both institutions and individuals, as far as average trade size is concerned it seems to
make little di¤erence whether they are active or passive.
6 Note that signicance tests are not strictly warranted in this case, because many of the returns are for
overlapping periods, a problem we address later.
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case (u-i), and where both parties were institutions (i-i). The lower half of the table gives
the same analysis for sells. In both cases, the last two lines cover cases where one or the
other party was unclassied (labelled other).
The most notable results in the table are in the i-u and u-i lines. From the returns
column, it can be seen that institutions buying shares o¤ered by individual traders earned
an average return of just under 0.5%. On the other hand, when the roles were reversed,
individuals earned only 0.16%, with the other two categories generating returns in between
these two extremes. Looking at the sell trades, the same pattern is repeated, with the return
in the aftermath of institutional sales to individuals averaging -0.35%, while the reverse deals
were followed only by a share price fall of 0.07%.7 The obvious interpretation of these results
is that, judged by the most direct criterion, institutions are better informed than individuals,
so they make signicantly higher returns when they initiate trades with individuals than with
other institutions. At the same time, some individual traders are apparently well-informed
enough to prot from deals with other individuals, as evidenced by the return of 0.31% from
u-u buys and -0.27% from u-u sells. Note that when individuals buy shares from sales o¤ers
posted by institutions, they earn only 0.16%, and when selling to institutions, the subsequent
price fall is only 0.04%.
The advantages enjoyed by the institutions is also apparent from the spread, which is
about 0.7% on i-i deals, but averages 1.8% on buys between individuals and over 2.5% on
7 Note that most of the hour returns are overlapping. But the di¤erences between i-u and u-i categories
are signicant, as can be seen from the regression analyses later in the section. For all other variables, most
of the di¤erences are signicant based on the Newey-West robustness correction. Results are available from
authors upon request.
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sell trades. The lower spreads on all-institution deals is likely to be explained to a great
extent by the fact that they tend to be around 3 to 7 times as large as trades between
individuals. However, the literature relates the spread to two other variables. On the one
hand, the more information asymmetry in the market (or believed to be in the market), the
wider spreads have to be in order to protect traders submitting limit orders from the peril
of adverse selection bias. On the other hand, the more liquid the market for a stock, the
lower the spread, other things being equal. In the present case, the fact that the spread on
all-institution trades is so small (roughly 0.7%) means that the di¤erence in returns between
u-u and i-u has to be attributable to information asymmetry.
There are two possible objections to these results. The rst is that they are based on an
arbitrary classication criterion: if more than 50% of the buying (selling) side is institutional,
the buyer (seller) is treated as an institution in Table 2. Otherwise, it is treated as a private
trade. However, to ensure the results are not distorted by the application of this criterion,
Table 3 compares the results of using three di¤erent cut-o¤ points: 25%, 50% and 75%. We
also take the opportunity to analyse the results for small, medium and large rms.
Looking at the nal column of the table rst, it is evident that, as expected, the return
ranking is preserved across trade-types. It remains the case that i-u trades earn the highest
returns for all three classication criteria, while u-i still earn the lowest, conrming our con-
clusions regarding the informational disadvantage faced by private traders. The conclusion
is reinforced insofar as returns tend to be higher the greater the proportion of institutional
trade, and lower the more privateis a trade.
The analysis by rm size also conforms to expectations. Although small rms generate
higher returns than large other things being equal, it remains true that within each size
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category, the highest returns are earned when institutions hit individualslimit orders.
Insofar as they relate to partially overlapping periods, these results su¤er from another
possible shortcoming. In order to remedy this problem and to allow more rigorous hypothesis
testing, we present regressions on non-overlapping returns in Tables 4 and 5, for 50% and
75% volume criteria respectively. (Note that the number of observations is reduced to just
over 16000 for both buy and sell trades, as a result of eliminating overlaps.) In the rst
instance, the constant is associated with u-i and the other independent variables are simply
four indicator dummies taking the value 1 when the trade is u-u (i-u, i-i and other), zero
otherwise. Doing so gives an easy reading as to whether the returns of other trade categories
are signicantly larger than that of u-i. The results here are striking. As can be seen
from the second and third columns of the table, the key nding is that institutions make
signicant returns from deals they initiate with individuals, whether they buy or sell, whereas
individuals tend to lose when they hit limit orders posted by institutions. Moreover, this
conclusion is quite robust to the introduction of more conventional explanatory variables.
Both beta and (log of) market value enter the equation with the correct sign, the latter highly
signicant, but neither causes the signs on the four trade-type dummies to change. In the last
two columns of the table, we introduce variables which gure largely in the microstructure
literature: (log of) trade size (Hasbrouck (1991b)), bid-ask spread, total depth and net depth.
Again the trade-type dummies point to the same conclusion. Noticeably, beta remains
insignicant, while market value remains signicant and correctly signed i.e. larger stocks
provide lower returns to stock buyers and larger returns to sellers. On the other hand, trade
size has a positive e¤ect on returns, as in Hasbrouck (1996). The nal three variables in
Tables 4 and 5 relate to the level of information asymmetry. The spread is believed to be
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positively related to information asymmetry, a point reected in the fact that it is associated
with signicantly higher returns to both buy and sell trades. The same applies to the net
depth (D-depth in the table). On the other hand, greater liquidity, as measured by total
depth on both buy and sell sides, attracts a lower return since it implies less risk, other
things being equal. Not surprisingly, our conclusions emerge even more sharply when the
75% criterion is applied (Table 5) than with the 50% cuto¤ (Table 4).
4 Intraday Trading Patterns
In their experiment-based research, Bloomeld, OHara, and Saar (2005) found that informed
traders choose to place market orders in the morning, so as to maximise their advantage be-
fore their private information can leak into the public domain. Towards the close of business,
as the price is driven towards its fair value, in the process eroding their trading advantage,
they switch to limit orders. On the other hand, uninformed liquidity traders submit limit
orders at rst, then market orders as the end of trading approaches, in order to achieve their
trading objectives by the close of business. While Anand, Chakravarty and Martell (2005)
provide some evidence in support of these experimental ndings, their approach is indirect
insofar as they show only that the informativeness of limit orders declines in the second half
of trading. Our intraday analysis of the disaggregated data, on the other hand, provides
direct evidence of an increase in the number of informed, passive limit orders as market
closing approaches.
Table 6 summarises the intraday data.
First, our previous analyses have established that institutions are better informed than
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individuals. As such, the passive sell orders by institutions in the B(u-i) category suggest
that the stocks concerned would underperform the market. This knowledge is likely to be
shared by other equally informed institutions and this leaves the relatively uninformed retail
investors to actively buy these stocks. Now if we consider the volume data in the top segment
of the table, we see in broad terms the familiar U-shape replicated. Closer observation on
the rst and last hour of trading, however, reveals a surge of 40% more passive sell limit
orders (1,978,000 shares) placed by institutions in the B(u-i) category at the close of market,
which is in sharp contrast with other categories in which the volume of nal hour trading
remains about the same or even less. We take this as evidence supporting the claim that
informed traders switch to limit orders when the price is near its fair value towards the close
of market. Though no such evidence is found for the S(u-i) case, we o¤er a possible reason.
We rst note that the TORQ sample experienced a general increase in stock prices over
the period studied. As our analysis is only based on realised trades, it is possible that the
buy limit orders by the more informed institutions were not taken up in an upward moving
market.8
Throughout the day, the overwhelming majority of trades involve institutions on both
sides. Moreover, the return earned on this type of trade is relatively low less than half that
on trades between institutions and individuals, conrming that most are motivated more
by liquidity requirements than by information. We can relate this evidence to the conclu-
sion of Duarte and Young (2007), who nd that Easley, Hvidkjaer and OHara (2002)s PIN
8 We remark that Chakravarty (2001) and Anand, Chakravarty and Martell (2005), which use the same
TORQ database, consider only buy trades in their analysis of informativeness of institutions trades and
limit orders.
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predominantly reects trading driven by liquidity requirements rather than by information,
and may also shed some light on why PIN is found by Vega (2006) to be insignicant in
explaining the price reaction to public and private information.
As far as returns are concerned, the decreasing pattern over the day is broadly consistent
with the Hasbrouck (1991b) price impact measure based on a vector autoregressive model
for trades and returns. In fact, institutions buying from individuals make average returns
of 0.66% in the rst hour, 0.52% in the middle of the day and still a substantial 0.4% in
the nal hours trade. Moreover, as passive sellers to individuals, they earn more in the
nal hour than in the rest of the day, suggesting that they do indeed switch to limit orders
in late afternoon, conrming the ndings of Anand, Chakravarty and Martell (2005) and
Bloomeld, OHara, and Saar (2005).
5 Conclusions
This paper has presented results based on a novel disaggregation of the well-known TORQ
dataset by private versus institutional trader on both active and passive sides, to allow for the
fact that in the light of work by Bloomeld, OHara, and Saar (2005), Kaniel and Liu (2006)
and Anand, Chakravarty and Martell (2005), we can no longer assume that informed traders
always use market orders. On the whole, our ndings conrm the results from the theoretical
models, without the need to make the same simplifying assumptions needed to rule out strate-
gic behaviour by informed agents. More generally, while volume is indicative of information
ow (e.g. Clark (1973), Tauchen and Pitts (1983) and Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990),
Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1994)), we nd the bulk of trade is generated by the intra-
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institution category, which has all the characteristics of liquidity trading (low information
content, low return and the narrowest spread).
The approach followed here opens up a number of di¤erent avenues for exploration. It
would, for example, be interesting to know whether the Easley, Hvidkjaer and OHara (2002)
PIN is robust enough to survive as a measure of information content in the context of the
type of disaggregation used here.
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Table 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Total Institution Individual Unclassified Institution Individual Unclassified
#buy trades (thousands) 256 108 49 99 111 40 106
Total volume (million shares) 393 237 31 125 211 25 157
Average volume per trade (shares) 1532 2189 630 1266 1900 629 1484
Average Std error Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Mid-quote price 1 hr log-return (%) 0.249 0.006 -87.821 -0.164 0.050 0.534 117.401
Spread (%) 0.997 0.005 0.098 0.283 0.580 1.183 30.769
Bid plus ask depth (shares) 204.7 0.900 2 53 115 250 1998
Bid minus ask depth (shares) 18.6 0.584 -993 -30 0 50 998
Buy trades
Active Passive
#best buy quotes = 83018
Total Institution Individual Unclassified Institution Individual Unclassified
#sell trades (thousands) 215 90 48 77 93 35 87
Total volume (million shares) 321 200 31 91 177 20 124
Average volume per trade (shares) 1494 2221 638 1177 1899 577 1427
Average Std error Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Mid-quote price 1 hr log-return (%) -0.119 0.007 -87.821 -0.409 0.000 0.241 139.216
Spread (%) 1.098 0.006 0.098 0.257 0.576 1.250 31.579
Bid plus ask depth (shares) 220.8 0.999 2 55 120 270 1998
Ask minus bid depth (shares) 56.6 0.674 -995 -10 10 90 998
Only NYSE quotes and trades are used in our analyses. To remove potential outliers from our sample, firms with less than 100 quotes or with spread 
larger than 50% are removed. After applying the filter rules, we are left with 136 firms in the sample. Each trade's direction (buy or sell) is determined 
using the method given by Lee and Ready (1991). For buyer (seller) initiated trades, the buy (sell) shares are described as active whereas the sell (buy) 
shares are passive, with classification based on the TORQ  audit trail. The 1 hour mid-quote log return is the log of mid-quote at (t + 1 hour )  less the  
log of mid-quote at t , where t  is the time the trade takes place. Spread is the quoted spread divided by the mid-quote. The depth refers to the size (in 
number of shares) at the best bid and ask being quoted.
Sell trades
Active Passive
#best sell quotes = 73811
Table 2: RETURNS AND TRADE CATEGORIES
nq return Spread Depth nt trade size nt trade size
u-u 2991 0.315 1.835 185 219 412 5019 506
i-u 2886 0.474 1.375 194 4957 1216 6874 957
u-i 6720 0.161 1.275 226 10671 872 13692 805
i-i 19409 0.218 0.689 234 51681 2833 74048 2229
other 53751 0.268 1.063 189 52299 1674 163684 1315
BUY TRADES
SELL TRADES
Institution Inst + Indi + uncl
nq return Spread Depth nt trade size nt trade size
u-u 3395 -0.274 2.535 201 299 371 6156 517
i-u 2555 -0.348 1.740 210 4358 1131 6107 884
u-i 7292 -0.041 1.407 251 11491 841 14790 767
i-i 17147 -0.072 0.738 253 42301 3042 61055 2333
other 46312 -0.145 1.150 200 43967 1575 133700 1242
Institution Inst + Indi + uncl
u and i are used to denote trades where individuals and institutions respectively account for more than 50% of 
shares traded. There are 8 categories of buy and sell trades to be considered. For example, an i-u buy trade 
means institutions account for more than 50% of the trade-initiating (active) buy shares whereas individuals 
account for more than 50% of the liquidity-providing (passive) sell shares. nq and nt are the number of quotes 
and trades respectively. Return is the 1-hr mid-quote log-return, spread is quoted spread divided by mid-
quote, depth is the bid-plus-ask depth, and trade size is the average number of shares traded in each trade. 
Figures that are bold and italic denote significantly different from zero at 1% level.
Table 3: FIRM SIZE AND VOLUME BREAKDOWN 
ALL FIRMS
n ret spr vol n ret spr vol n ret spr vol ret
75%< r 684 0.500 3.680 776 1089 0.344 1.509 599 752 0.140 0.618 347 0.326
50%< r 777 0.483 3.773 1074 1275 0.343 1.548 946 939 0.137 0.622 548 0.315
25%< r 964 0.556 4.041 1270 1692 0.336 1.630 919 1649 0.108 0.607 500 0.298
All 6143 0.751 4.377 1001 17821 0.385 1.590 733 61793 0.171 0.539 559 0.257
75%< r 331 1.316 3.796 1073 653 0.522 1.599 1341 1049 0.233 0.546 1029 0.502
50%< r 416 1.265 3.953 1446 892 0.540 1.630 1458 1578 0.229 0.552 1250 0.474
25%< r 559 1.205 4.107 1927 1359 0.551 1.670 1609 3364 0.192 0.518 1270 0.391
All 6143 0.751 4.377 2018 17821 0.385 1.590 2449 61793 0.171 0.539 2278 0.257
75%< r 635 0.355 4.453 934 1655 0.074 1.517 793 3090 0.078 0.502 742 0.109
50%< r 767 0.396 4.585 1089 1950 0.117 1.548 1038 4003 0.137 0.509 1094 0.161
25%< r 981 0.475 4.726 1097 2573 0.163 1.583 844 6167 0.130 0.517 966 0.174
All 6143 0.751 4.377 1750 17821 0.385 1.590 2243 61793 0.171 0.539 2071 0.257
75%< r 393 0.648 4.186 2894 1704 0.485 1.537 3863 10892 0.167 0.463 3190 0.224
50%< r 514 0.641 4.154 2446 2299 0.480 1.560 2711 16596 0.168 0.461 2303 0.218
25%< r 712 0.616 4.152 1812 3208 0.496 1.586 1833 23215 0.169 0.463 1780 0.219
All 6143 0.751 4.377 1490 17821 0.385 1.590 1606 61793 0.171 0.539 1490 0.257
ALL FIRMS
u-u
i-u
u-i
Small firms Medium firms Large firms
BUY TRADES
i-i
Small firms Medium firms Large firms
SELL TRADES
n ret spr vol n ret spr vol n ret spr vol ret
75%< r 1059 -0.345 4.905 702 996 -0.426 1.669 605 772 -0.036 0.612 576 -0.289
50%< r 1214 -0.361 4.931 1085 1181 -0.395 1.686 852 1000 -0.025 0.628 581 -0.274
25%< r 1463 -0.423 4.943 996 1613 -0.387 1.721 917 1769 -0.031 0.619 454 -0.268
All 7378 -0.543 4.877 843 15521 -0.252 1.627 855 53802 -0.040 0.521 554 -0.131
75%< r 381 -0.750 4.884 984 557 -0.502 1.618 1210 904 -0.083 0.579 940 -0.348
50%< r 491 -0.880 4.984 1481 723 -0.454 1.679 1344 1341 -0.096 0.585 1178 -0.348
25%< r 686 -0.874 5.147 1572 1126 -0.494 1.747 1398 2770 -0.082 0.570 1332 -0.302
All 7378 -0.543 4.877 1839 15521 -0.252 1.627 2357 53802 -0.040 0.521 2340 -0.131
75%< r 841 -0.238 5.132 793 1653 -0.068 1.581 928 3324 0.012 0.476 709 -0.047
50%< r 980 -0.277 5.098 897 1986 -0.087 1.600 1242 4326 0.033 0.482 925 -0.041
25%< r 1210 -0.264 5.030 659 2603 -0.108 1.616 801 6753 0.003 0.487 788 -0.055
All 7378 -0.543 4.877 1733 15521 -0.252 1.627 2364 53802 -0.040 0.521 2140 -0.131
75%< r 423 -0.532 4.384 2536 1642 -0.216 1.600 3764 9679 -0.050 0.459 3528 -0.091
50%< r 529 -0.500 4.500 2930 2301 -0.258 1.601 2469 14317 -0.027 0.461 2350 -0.072
25%< r 708 -0.559 4.564 1697 3098 -0.279 1.617 1741 19974 -0.023 0.462 1711 -0.072
All 7378 -0.543 4.877 1274 15521 -0.252 1.627 1368 53802 -0.040 0.521 1404 -0.131
r is the proportion of shares traded that are attributable to institutions or individuals e.g. a buy i-u category with r > 75% means 
that both the institutional active buy shares and the individual passive sell shares account for at least 75% of shares traded. n, 
ret, spr and vol are the number of quotes, mid-quote 1-hr log return, spread and trade size respectively. Firms are divided into 
small, medium and large depending on whether their market value is in the top, middle or bottom third.
u-u
i-u
u-i
i-i
Table 4: Regression using 50% volume criterion
Variables Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Constant(u-i) 0.157 2.801 0.176 3.166 0.210 3.562
Indicator(u-u) 0.120 1.724 0.052 0.775 0.043 0.668
Indicator(i-u) 0.367 5.352 0.410 5.874 0.353 5.027
Indicator(i-i) 0.054 0.918 0.093 1.564 0.010 0.135
Indicator(other) 0.083 1.394 0.019 0.329 -0.004 -0.074
beta 0.049 1.664 0.011 0.358
ln(MV) -0.093 -8.112 -0.056 -4.219
ln(trade size) 0.051 4.851
spread 0.057 2.242
D-depth (x1000) 0.968 9.110
depth (x1000) -0.164 -4.015
V i bl C ffi i t t t t C ffi i t t t t C ffi i t t t t
#Observations = 16272
BUY TRADES REGRESSION
R-sq = 0.0027 R-sq = 0.0128 R-sq = 0.0230
#Observations = 16270
SELL TRADES REGRESSION
R-sq = 0.0013 R-sq = 0.0073 R-sq = 0.0142
ar a es oe c en -s a oe c en -s a oe c en -s a
Constant(u-i) -0.030 -0.722 -0.057 -1.401 -0.093 -2.265
Indicator(u-u) -0.186 -3.377 -0.116 -2.248 -0.091 -1.699
Indicator(i-u) -0.288 -4.197 -0.300 -4.338 -0.234 -3.440
Indicator(i-i) -0.096 -2.110 -0.119 -2.542 -0.036 -0.789
Indicator(other) -0.113 -2.209 -0.048 -1.014 -0.025 -0.534
beta -0.054 -1.905 -0.040 -1.397
ln(MV) 0.073 6.968 0.042 3.465
ln(trade size) -0.047 -4.294
spread -0.051 -3.023
D-depth (x1000) -0.852 -9.576
depth (x1000) 0.255 5.960
Non-overlapping mid-quote log returns are used in the regressions.Beta is obtained using 36 monthly 
stock returns regressing on the equal-weighted return index. ln(MV), ln(trade size) are logs of firm size 
and trade size). Spread and depth are as defined in Table 2. For buy (sell) trades regression, D-depth is 
the bid-minus-ask (ask-minus-bid) depth. Except for the constant and indicator variables, all control 
variables are mean adjusted (to have zero means). The 50% criterion is used to define both u and i. The 
coefficient of the constant gives the mean return on u-i trades, whereas the other categories give the 
incremental returns over u-i. t-stat is calculated using White's (1980) method to correct for 
heteroscedasticity.
Table 5: Regression using 75% volume criterion
Variables Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Constant(u-i) 0.104 2.659 0.127 3.189 0.162 3.916
Indicator(u-u) 0.181 3.098 0.107 1.807 0.099 1.702
Indicator(i-u) 0.418 7.465 0.450 8.151 0.400 7.354
Indicator(i-i) 0.161 2.732 0.206 3.620 0.127 1.984
Other 0.156 3.635 0.099 2.296 0.064 1.418
beta 0.058 2.079 0.017 0.562
ln(MV) -0.090 -8.430 -0.048 -3.750
ln(trade size) 0.043 5.419
spread 0.067 2.604
D-depth (x1000) 0.991 11.531
depth (x1000) -0.158 -4.048
Variables Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Constant(u-i) -0 034 -0 742 -0 061 -1 368 -0 099 -2 215
BUY TRADES REGRESSION
#Observations = 16270
R-sq = 0.0027 R-sq = 0.0132 R-sq = 0.0249
SELL TRADES REGRESSION
#Observations = 16272
R-sq = 0.0007 R-sq = 0.0070 R-sq = 0.0146
. . . . . .
Indicator(u-u) -0.171 -2.832 -0.098 -1.737 -0.072 -1.242
Indicator(i-u) -0.235 -3.338 -0.243 -3.437 -0.187 -2.657
Indicator(i-i) -0.095 -1.890 -0.126 -2.437 -0.041 -0.796
Other -0.132 -2.536 -0.078 -1.602 -0.043 -0.896
beta -0.064 -2.284 -0.046 -1.609
ln(MV) 0.072 6.993 0.036 3.053
ln(trade size) -0.047 -4.540
spread -0.058 -3.468
D-depth (x1000) -0.850 -9.206
depth (x1000) 0.224 5.224
Non-overlapping mid-quote log returns are used in the regressions. Beta is obtained using 36 monthly 
stock returns regressing on the equal-weighted return index. ln(MV), ln(trade size) are logs of firm size 
and trade size). Spread and depth are as defined in Table 2. For buy (sell) trades regression, D-depth is 
the bid-minus-ask (ask-minus-bid) depth. Except for the constant and indicator variables, all control 
variables are mean adjusted (to have zero means). The 75% criterion is used to define both u and i. The 
coefficient of the constant gives the mean return on u-i trades, whereas the other categories give the 
incremental returns over u-i. t-stat is calculated using White's (1980) method to correct for 
heteroscedasticity.
Table 6: INTRADAY ANALYSIS
0930-1030 1030-1500 1500-1600 0930-1030 1030-1500 1500-1600
u-u 14 13 19 18 17 16
i-u 955 907 990 1070 655 914
u-i 1414 1315 1978 2031 1336 1623
i-i 30515 20016 25801 28325 17599 21162
other 17498 12072 15727 15375 9196 12490
u-u 0.319 0.283 0.212 -0.424 -0.177 -0.182
i-u 0.664 0.518 0.409 -0.396 -0.353 -0.135
u-i 0.163 0.151 0.178 -0.105 -0.078 0.224
i-i 0.280 0.199 0.188 -0.179 -0.134 -0.042
other 0.242 0.249 0.212 -0.271 -0.144 -0.034
BUYS per hour SELLS per hour
Volume 
(1000 
shares)
Return
u-u 1.657 1.850 1.937 2.616 2.512 2.548
i-u 1.528 1.350 1.328 1.627 1.762 1.777
u-i 1.306 1.268 1.276 1.521 1.362 1.455
i-i 0.675 0.688 0.708 0.699 0.752 0.736
other 1.044 1.056 1.101 1.113 1.133 1.241
u-u 165 188 189 215 202 185
i-u 175 198 198 232 203 213
u-i 214 231 214 276 249 230
i-i 228 239 221 268 253 237
other 180 195 175 193 206 187
Various statistics are provided for 0930-1030, 1030-1500 and 1500-1600 time intervals. Volume is the total 
number of institutional shares on the active side for u-u, i-u, i-i and 'other' categories; for u-i, number of passive 
institutional shares is calculated. For the 1030-1500, volumes are divided by 4.5 so that the reported figures are 
representative of an hour's volume in the time interval. Non-overlapping mid-quote log returns are used to 
calculate the average returns. Spread is the quoted spread divided by mid-quote and depth is the bid-plus-ask 
depth. Figures in bold (italic bold) are significant at the 5% (1%) level. For the 10.30-15.00 time-interval, 
significance is with respect to differnce from zero; for the first and last hour time intervals, significance is with 
respect to difference from the 10.30-15.00 time interval.
Spread
Depth
